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STUDENT NOTES
liability. But it seems that the manifest intent of the section, so
far as such intent is judicially determined, was otherwise.'0 And
a common-sense reading of it would seem to support this view. A
contrary holding would throw open the avenue to considerable
fraud. Persons in a position to know the institution's condition,
and at least inferentially aware of the impending catastrophe,
could transfer their stock to parties perhaps not financially re-
sponsible. Such a transfer would stand on approximately the same
ground as a transfer of property in contemplation of bankruptcy.
On the whole the interpretation given by the court to this
constitutional provision and its accompanying statutes, as
evidenced in Tabler v. Higginbotham ' and other cases, seems con-
sonant with the idea of giving the depositor proper consideration
and shortly determining the affairs of a defunct banking corpora-
tion.
-ROBERT E. STEALEY.
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS AND CONTRACTS TO CONVEY IN WEST
VmGINA.-The absence in a jurisdiction of a historic statutory
provision that is in existence almost universally may raise as many
difficulties as the existence of a peculiar local statute operating
upon the general principles of the common law. This fact is
strikingly shown in the absence of the seventh section of the Eng-
lish Statute of Frauds in West Virginia. The failure of our
legislature to enact this section requiring all declarations of trust
in realty to be in writing has caused quite a confusion in the cases
as to the validity of oral trusts in West Virginia.
The cases coming within the scope of this problem may be
readily divided into two classes-declarations of trust by the
grantor, and like declarations by the grantee. As to the first
class there are three separate situations set forth in the leading
case of Troll -v. Carter', which has been adopted by the cases as
the law of this state. They are:
(1) When the grantee orally agrees to hold in trust for the
1 0Dunn v. Bank, supra n. 13; MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING (6th ed. Voor-
bees, 1928) § 675a. Many legal theorists and philosophers maintain that the
intent of the legislature is incapable of determination and is a myth used to
cloak judge-made law. In the language of Justice Holmes, "A word is but
the skin of a living thought". So a statute may be only a pallid skin.
Nevertheless, from time and circumstances of its adoption the purpose of
legislation can often be determined beyond reasonable doubt.
27Supra n. 11.
115 W. Va. 567 (1879).
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grantor, the agreement is not enforceable.
(2) When the grantee orally agrees to hold in trust for a
third person, the agreement is enforceable, if the grantee
paid no consideration.
(3) When the grantee orally agrees to hold in trust for a
third person, the agreement is not enforceable, if the
grantee paid consideration.
As to the first situation the court said the agreement amounts
to a contract to convey and therefore must be in writing. It seems
clear that this is not an executory contract, at least in its normal
sense, but is a part of the transaction itself and is fully executed.
The court held the second situation a valid trust, because
otherwise the grantee would be permitted to commit a fraud. Thus
the court does not follow its reasoning in the last situation, that
the agreement is a contract to convey. That argument would be
equally applicable to this situation, but the court disregarded it
and based its decision upon the ground of constructive trusts
to prevent the grantee from committing a fraud, which reason-
ing would be equally true to the first situation.
As to the third question, which was not decided, the court
suggested that the agreement would not be binding. Judge Green
said that even before the Statute of Frauds a trust had to be
created by writing, except in the case of a feoffment in which
title passed by delivery without a writing. Since title passes by
deed now, he concluded that a writing is necessary to create a
trust.' This view of the law has been followed in the later West
Virginia cases!
The first express statutory provision in this state with regard
to trusts is in the 1931 WEST VIRGUIIA CODE.' It provides that all
declarations of trust shall be in writing, except declarations of
trust for the grantor and declarations for a third person accom-
panying conveyances not fraudulent. This statute seems to
2 In 1 SPENOE'S EQUITABLE JURISDICTION (1846) 449, it is said: "An use
or a trust might be raised, by mere verbal directions, upon a conveyance that
passed the possession of some solemn act, as a feoffment, fine, or recovery;
for as a feoffment with livery of seisin, which passed the estate, might be
made at Common Law by parol, so might the uses of the estate be declared
by parol; but where a deed was requisite to the passing the estate itself, as
upon a grant of a rent or the like, a deed was necessary for the declaration
of the uses. A man, it seems, might covenant to stand seised to an use
without a deed. A feoffment without livery did not raise an use, for the
party could not acquire an use by an imperfect instrument whereby it was
intended he should take the legal estate."2
3See Madden: Trusts and The ,Statute of Frauds (1925) 31 W. VA. L.
QUA. 166, where the cases are collected and discussed.
1W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 36, art. 1, § 4.
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clarify the law as to declarations of trust and make the agree-
ments set out in the three situations in Troll v. Carter' valid as ex-
press trusts.
But, while the court was deciding case after case upholding
the rules laid down in Troll v. Garter9 as to declarations of trust
by the grantor, it concluded to the contrary, in its reasoning at
least, as to declarations of trust by the grantee. Perhaps all of
these cases, from the leading case of Currence v. Ward' on, could
have been decided upon the theory of constructive trusts, but
Floyd v. Duffy' was the first decision resting upon that ground.
In Currence v. Ward' there was an agreement by the pur-
chaser to buy in land at a judicial sale for the benefit of the
debtor. Before all the purchase money was paid by the debtor
and before legal title was taken by the purchaser, he sold to a
third party and the debtor sought to set the sale aside. Judge
Brannon in the course of his discussion as to the distinction be-
tween express and constructive trusts said: "It is well settled
that before that statute in England (Statute of Frauds) such a
trust in lands could be created without a writing, and, of course,
it can be so here now.... Such a trust must be created before the
trustee obtains legal title, for, if the agreement be subsequent, it
would fall under the provisions of the statute of frauds requiring
the transfer or sale of lands to be in writing. . . . I think the
evidence, which I will not entail, established the fact that prior to
the first sale under decree, the purchasers and Currence had an
agreement and understanding by which the said purchasers were to
buy in the land in their names for the benefit of Currence, and that
upon his payment of the purchase money the land was to be his.
This surely created a direct or express trust".
It is apparent from the above statement that the view of our
court upon the effect of the absence of the seventh section of the
English Statute of Frauds was contrary to the view taken as to
an oral trust declared by the grantor. Without expressing an
opinion as to the correctness of the view as to trusts declared by
the grantor, it is submitted that the view of the court in Currence
v. Ward ° is erroneous, because such agreements by the grantee, if
5 Supra n. 1.
Supra n. 1.
43 W. Va. 367, 27 S. E. 329 (1897).
'68 W. Va. 339, 69 S. E. 993 (1910).
Supra n. 7.
20Supra n. 7.
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made before the grantee takes legal title, violate the statute's
requirement that contracts for the sale of land be in writing, just
like the agreement after title is taken violates the requirement
of the statute, that the transfer of title shall be by writing. Under
our present trust statute both situations are invalid.
It should be noticed that Judge Dent concurred in Currence
v. WareV, not upon the ground of express trust, but because a
constructive trust arose from the relationship of the parties. But
cases prior to Floyd v. Duffy' proceed upon the theory of express
rather than constructive trust. In Hamilton v. McKinney land
was bought by two parties jointly for the purpose of speculation,
but title was taken only in the name of one. The court held that
an express trust was created, since both the agreement and the
payment of money took place before legal title passed. The
majority opinion in Currence v. Ward" was again upheld in Jomn-
son v. Ludwick,' where property was purchased by the husband in
the name of the wife under an agreement to hold in trust for the
husband, and it was held to create an express trust.
In all of these cases there was a basis for the court to declare
a trust to arise by operation of law, as is the ordinary case of re-
sulting and constructive trusts elsewhere. This view of the situa-
tion was taken by the court in the case of Floyd v. Duffy". There
the facts were like Hamilton v. McKinney. Land was bought
jointly for the purpose of resale at a profit, but title was taken
only in the name of one. Judge Poffenbarger said the agreement
was merely a contract to convey, but a trust would be declared,
not upon the ground of an express trust, but constructive trust,
because the agreement to hold for speculation and profit consti-
tuted "an independent equity, a right in respect to the property,
resting in justice, equity and good conscience, and not denied to
him by the statute of frauds". Thus the trust was not based upon
the agreement, as such, but upon the joint undertaking as consti-
tuting an independent equity. Although this note is not directed
at the insufficiency of circumstances constituting a constructive
trust, it does seem that the court in adopting a purchase for pur-
pose of speculation as such an independent equity is minimizing
n Supra n. S.22Supra n. S.
- 52 W. Va. 317, 43 S. E. 82 (1902).
24 Supra n. 7.
-558 W. Va. 464, 52 S. E. 489 (1905).
0 Supra n. 8.
7 Supra n. 13.
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the requirement to almost nothing more than the agreement itself.
An agent in the case of Henderson v. Henrie1P bought under a
prior oral agreement to hold in trust for his principal. The court
declared the agreement directly within the teeth of the statute
and there was no independent equity to raise a constructive trust.
The court announced as the rule in West Virginia, that oral agree-
ments by the grentee with a third person before legal title is taken,
to hold in trust for such third persons are not express trusts, but
contracts to convey, which are in violation of the statute, and no
trust will be declared unless there are facts creating an inde-
pendent equity, so as to constitute a constructive trust.
As mentioned before, the new code requires, in addition to
the provisions that conveyances of land and contracts for the sale
of land must be in writing, that all declarations of trust must be
in writing to be enforceable, except declarations of trust for the
grantor or a third person accompanying a conveyance not fraudu-
lent". All doubt as to the validity of oral agreements by the
grantee with third persons before legal title is taken is now seem-
ingly removed by statute, and only oral trusts declared by the
grantor are enforceable.
-JOHN HAMPTON HOGE.
TRUSTS-USE OF THE TRUST DEVICE TO ESCAPE FEDERAL ES-
TATE TAxEs.-The federal estate tax is levied on the privilege of
transmission of property, the shifting of the legal interest at
death. Undoubtedly the trust, long a device used for avoiding
burdens imposed by law, has been used to evade this tax. Congress
has closed this avenue of escape by legislation, hindered however,
by the frequently reiterated words of the Supreme Court of the
United States, that "such statutes are not to be extended by im-
plication beyond the clear import of the language used. If the
words are doubtful, the doubt must be resolved against the gov-
ernment and in favor of the taxpayer."'
- 68 W. Va. 562, 71 S. E. 172 (1911).
" W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 36, art. 1, § § 1, 3.
0Supra n. 4.
"Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U. S. 61, 44 S. Ct. 293 (1924).
2 Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 38 S. Ct. 53 (1917); U. S. v. Merriman,
263 U. S. 179, 44 S. Ct. 69 (1923); Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278
U. S. 339, 49 S. Ct. 123 (1929).
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